October 6, 1973—Yom Kippur/Ramadan: Another Echo from the Bloody Past

While much of Israel stood still in prayer, across the Suez Canal and in the Golan Heights, something thunderous was brewing.

The sky cracked open over the Sinai Desert as Egyptian MiGs roared past, unleashing the opening salvos of Operation Badr. At almost the same moment, Syrian tanks surged down from the Golan Heights, their cannons roaring like ancient gods awakened. Israel, believing the threat of war to be low, had been caught in a masterstroke of deception.

The Egyptian forces, better trained and armed than in past conflicts, stormed across the Suez Canal, overwhelming the mighty Bar Lev Line. Thousands of Israeli soldiers were pinned down or overrun. Simultaneously, Syrian armor pierced deep into Israeli-held Golan, racing toward the Galilee.

In military command centers in Tel Aviv, panic edged into the voices of Israeli generals. For the first time since 1948, the specter of defeat loomed.

But then, the tide began to turn.

Within 48 hours, Israel’s reserve forces—drawn from farms, kibbutzim, and city streets—flooded into action. They fought brutal, attritional battles in the Golan, halting the Syrian advance just 40 kilometers from Haifa. In the south, after days of stalling, General Ariel Sharon launched a daring maneuver: crossing the Suez Canal into Egypt, encircling the Egyptian Third Army.

World powers bristled. The U.S. initiated an emergency airlift of weapons to Israel, while the USSR backed Egypt and Syria. For a heartbeat, the world teetered on the edge of nuclear escalation.

The U.S. role in the 1973 Yom Kippur War was not just decisive: it was pivotal in preventing a potential Israeli collapse during the early days of the conflict.

President Richard Nixon, along with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, authorized Operation Nickel Grass, a massive, around-the-clock airlift of military supplies to Israel. Over the course of the operation, the U.S. delivered over 22,000 tons of tanks, artillery, ammunition, and aircraft. This resupply effort was critical in allowing Israel to regroup, counterattack, and eventually push back both Egyptian and Syrian forces

But it wasn’t just about hardware. The U.S. also provided vital intelligence, diplomatic cover at the United Nations, and a strategic deterrent. At one point, when the Soviet Union threatened to intervene on behalf of Egypt, the U.S. raised its nuclear alert level to DEFCON 3, a clear signal that it would not tolerate direct Soviet involvement

Finally, on October 25, a ceasefire, brokered by the United Nations and pressured by the superpowers, brought the guns to silence. But nothing was the same.

The 1973 war wasn’t just a military clash—it was a psychological reckoning. It shattered Israel’s myth of invincibility, revived Arab pride, and set the stage for diplomacy that had once seemed impossible. From its ashes would rise the Camp David Accords and a reimagined Middle East.

But it was a Middle East in which Egypt and other Arab powers were removed from the conflict, leaving Palestine increasingly isolated.

Edward Said felt that the Camp David Accords were fundamentally flawed because they prioritized Israeli security and recognition over Palestinian rights and sovereignty. He saw it as a strategic loss for Palestinians, weakening their negotiating position and fragmenting Arab solidarity.

I wonder what Professor Said would have been saying if he were alive today. There's still no peace, and the Palestinians remain stateless. And the circle of war threatens to widen explosively, with the Israeli attack on Iran and Gaza being pummelled into debris.