The Qur’an-Only Movement

The Qur’an-only movement, known variously as Qur’aniyun, Quranism, or Ahl al-Qur’an, represents a marginal yet persistent reformist trend within Islam that insists on the Qur’an as the sole authoritative and sufficient source of religious guidance. 

Its adherents reject the binding legislative authority of Hadith—the reported sayings and actions of the Prophet Muhammad (ﷺ)—arguing that the Qur’an is complete, fully detailed, and divinely preserved (citing verses such as 6:114, 16:89, and 15:9), while Hadith collections, compiled centuries after the Prophet’s death, are prone to human error, contradiction, and fabrication. 

This position, though marginal, has appeared independently in multiple regions of the world since the late 19th century, driven by modernist impulses, rationalism, and dissatisfaction with traditional clerical authority.

Historically, the movement draws partial inspiration from earlier Islamic currents such as Mu’tazilism, which prioritized reason (aql) alongside revelation and exhibited skepticism toward many Hadith narrations, and certain Kharijite tendencies that emphasized strict scripturalism. 

Modern Qur’anism, however, crystallized amid colonial encounters, Western rationalist influence, and anti-traditionalist reforms. 

Across Egypt, India, Nigeria, and beyond, it shares core convergences—rational interpretation, simplification of ritual, and critique of intermediary authority—while diverging significantly in social base, tone, and reception due to local contexts.

In Egypt, the movement emerged as an intellectual, university-linked phenomenon. Muhammad Tawfiq Sidqi’s 1906 article “Islam is the Qur’an Alone,” published in the influential journal Al-Manar, articulated a modernist vision influenced by Muhammad Abduh’s rational reforms. 

Sidqi argued that the Prophet’s Sunnah was contextual guidance rather than eternal law, and later figures such as Ahmed Subhy Mansour and Gamal al-Banna extended this into calls for democratic and humanistic readings. 

Egyptian Qur’anism remained scholarly, often partially accepting mass-transmitted (mutawatir) Hadith, and faced periodic state and clerical suppression, yet it profoundly influenced global networks through emigrants like Rashad Khalifa.

In India, particularly Punjab under British rule, the movement took shape as Ahl al-Qur’an, founded by Abdullah Chakralawi around 1900. 

Chakralawi and successors like Khwaja Ahmad Din Amritsari rejected Hadith entirely, condemned shrine veneration and piri-muridi (master-disciple hierarchies), and positioned their approach as a rational alternative to both Sufi traditionalism and Ahl-i Hadith literalism. 

Indian Qur’anism benefited from colonial-era freedoms of expression and later migrated to Pakistan through Ghulam Ahmed Parwez’s Tolu-e-Islam, maintaining a reformist rather than militant character and achieving modest organized presence.

Nigeria presents a different profile. Here, Qur’an-only ideas surfaced in the mid-20th century among Hausa communities as “Kala Kato” (“a mere man said it”), expressing grassroots rejection of Hadith as human invention. 

Low-brow variants, sometimes linked to the apocalyptic and violent Yan Tatsine movement of Muhammadu Marwa Maitatsine in the 1980s, led to deadly clashes with authorities. 

Urban, more scholarly strands—influenced indirectly by Rashad Khalifa via figures like Judge Isa Othman and preachers such as the former Izala preacher, Mallam Usman Dangungu—established mosques and subsequently spread online, practicing distinctive rituals such as three daily prayers. 

Contemporary figures like Sheikh Yahya Ibrahim Masussuka occupy a grey zone: prioritizing rational Qur’anic exegesis and questioning the Hadith corpus without full rejection, they provoke fierce opposition from both Salafi/Izala and some Sufi (Ɗarika) scholars, yet emphasize interfaith peace rather than confrontation. 

Masussuka set three novel criteria for accepting hadith: it should not contradict the Qur'àn, it should not impeach the reputation of the Prophet (ﷺ), and it should not call to terrorism.

Unlike the Shia-leaning Hadith critic Abduljabbar Nasiru Kabara, who faced blasphemy charges and unified Sunni backlash, Masussuka critiques perceived rigidity across Sunni sectarian lines without aligning with Shiism. In fact, he's critical of Shi'ism as well.

He is the rave of the moment like Dangungu before him. He is cheered on by admirers online as he takes on prominent Izala clerics and gives them derogatory nicknames in retaliation for labeling him 'Ƙalaƙato' or 'Ɗantatsine'.

Beyond these three regions, the movement has manifested diversely in far-flung Muslim countries.

In Turkey, a neo-Mu’tazilite revival promotes secular-compatible Qur’anic interpretation; in the United States, Rashad Khalifa’s United Submitters International popularized numerological approaches; in Libya under Gaddafi, the Qur’an was briefly declared the sole constitution; and in countries like Indonesia, Iran (within Shia contexts), and Kazakhstan, small societies advocate Qur’an-centric reform. 

Some expressions of the trend, such as certain Mozambican insurgents, adopt militant postures, while others remain moderate and intellectual.

Despite regional variations—intellectual in Egypt and Turkey, organized-reformist in India and Pakistan, often militant or socially marginal in Nigeria—the movement converges on a shared rationalist ethos, simplified ritual practice, and challenge to traditional authority structures. 

It appeals particularly to educated urbanites and those disillusioned with sectarianism or perceived stagnation, spreading rapidly in the digital age through online forums and translations.

Mainstream Sunni (and Shia) scholarship overwhelmingly rejects Qur’anism, arguing that the Qur’an itself explicitly commands obedience to the Prophet (ﷺ), which authentic Hadith are historically understood to embody. 

Other critics label it a modern revival of Kharijite deviation or a product of Orientalist influence. 

Nevertheless, the movement persists as a quiet but resilient voice calling for direct, unmediated engagement with the Qur’an—a call that, in an era of global connectivity and skepticism toward tradition, continues to find new audiences across the Muslim world.

Qur'anism is a recurrent heterodoxy that usually appears with a splash but soon peters out.